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Abstract 
In complex systems, disorder and order are interrelated, so that disorder can be an inevitable consequence 
of ordering. Often this disorder can be disruptive, but sometimes it can be beneficial. Different social 
groups will argue over what they consider to be disordered, so that naming of something as ‘disorder’ is 
often a political action. However, although people may not agree on what disorder is, almost everyone 
agrees that it is bad. This primarily theoretical sketch explores the inevitability and usefulness of disorder 
arising from ordering systems and argues that a representative democracy has to tolerate disorder so as to 
function.  
 
 
Introduction  
Much talk in political life suggests government waste or inefficiency is bad, duplication is 
bad, the number of politicians should be reduced, the number of tiers of government should 
be slashed, bureaucracies should be reduced and so on. In general it is assumed that, better, 
leaner, more efficient organisation, management, measurement or regulation, solves 
problems.  
 
The 2020 conference (2020 Plenary Stream Report) called for: ‘Performance targets’ (p.5), 
‘urgent action to increase economic capacity through the creation of a truly national, 
efficient, sustainable, innovative and inclusive economy supported by seamless regulation’ 
(p.8); ‘efficient regulation’ (p.9); ‘Regulation reform to reduce regulation overlaps and 
complexity and to incentivise timely investment in infrastructure’ (p.10); ‘An integrated, 
whole-of-government approach underpinned by clear targets and measurement with 
independent reporting’ (p.21); ‘uniform regulation’ (p.33), ‘Nationwide harmonisation of 
regulation, standards and enforcement’ (p.34) etc.  
 
Slightly later, prominent conservative politician, and now leader of the opposition, Tony 
Abbot was reported as announcing that: 
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‘The biggest problem Australia faces today is the dysfunctional Federation… It’s 
absolutely critical that we establish who’s in charge of all areas of governance. 
 
‘I will be arguing for a constitutional amendment to establish that, where it so wishes, the 
Commonwealth can pass laws to override the states - not just Section 51 as it is now, but 
in all areas… 
 
‘The federal government is totally hamstrung by the legal authority that resides in the 
states….  
 
The article went on to claim that: 
There is considerable bipartisan federal impatience with the incompetence and 
intransigence of the states. Last week, the Defence Minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, proposed 
abolishing the states altogether, an idea Mr Abbott described as impractical (SMH: 10 
July 2008). 
 
The ex-treasurer of NSW, Michael Costa also called for the abolition of the States saying, ‘it 
would remove a layer of political interference in service delivery’ (SMH 13 Sept 2008). A 
website for a group calling itself Australia 100 protested against ‘Duplicated Bureaucracies 
and Regulatory Regimes’, ‘Excessive parliamentarians’ and so on. Others (e.g. Cole and 
Parston 2006) call for ‘measured outcomes’ and ‘informed decisions’ (as if many people had 
campaigned on behalf of uninformed decisions). It is easy to find further examples, from all 
sides of politics, all calling for efficient organisation with a smooth flow of power.  
 
Although the 2020 conference emphasised ‘inclusion’ and ‘Rights’ in most of its panels, 
there was no consideration of whether such ‘inclusion’ or ‘Rights’ was compatible with these 
demands for efficiency.  
 
There is little criticism of this praise of order from social and political theory. From Bodin 
and Hobbes onwards the spectre of social disorder has been used to justify order of almost 
any type; in their case, order which can overwhelm claims of justice or ‘Rights’ (King 1974). 
Marx seems to have thought disorder and serious conflict would stop with the revolution. 
Durkheim thought anomie, or social disorder, to blame for suicide, and sought to prevent 
disorder in general, although he was happy to consider some forms of disorder (such as 
crime) as normal if the rituals around it restated the importance of order (Durkheim 2006; 
Marks 1974). Max Weber argued that we should construct unambiguous ‘ideal types’ to do 
our analysis, thus deleting disorder by ignoring it (Whimster 2004, pp.387ff.). Even 
Anarchists talk about spontaneous order, and rarely celebrate disorder itself: Proudhon 
supposedly declared that ‘anarchy is order’ (P.Marshall 1992, p. x). An obvious advantage of 
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focusing on order is that it helps to remove from our perception, those parts of social life that 
cannot be explained by the theory being proposed. 
 
However, what if disorder arises from ordering or if disorder is sometimes beneficial? If 
either of these possibilities are allowed, then we can challenge the notion that if something is 
not working then it must be in need of greater organisation. It might already be too organised, 
or organised according to inappropriate principles, or the ordering may have side effects. 
Perhaps redundancy, waste, disorder and frictions, provide the time and place to object, to 
slow things down, to circumvent rules, thus allowing Civil Society to function? If so, then it 
may be necessary to distinguish between creative, or functional, disorder on the one side and 
disruptive disorder on the other.  
 
To avoid confusion let me state what this paper is not arguing. Firstly I am not denying that 
social disorder can impinge negatively upon ‘human rights’, or that disorder, ambiguity or 
incoherency cannot be exploited to maintain an oppressive order (see for example Ferrara 
2003).  All disorder is not the same. 
 
Secondly I am not defending the order of corporate markets. The order of capitalism or 
markets is not under-regulated. The supposedly freer the market, the more protection and 
regulation the corporate sector has in their favour – such as copyright ownership; skewed 
distributions of income from work; rewards for failed executives; regulation of workers; 
diminution of responsibility for working conditions; regulation of unions, strikes or protests; 
shifting tax burdens onto the middle class; government transfer of taxpayer monies to the 
corporate sector through contracting or asset sales; shifting of responsibility for regulation 
onto the industries being regulated, and so on. Even if capitalism was anarchic, then by 
encouraging huge divergences of wealth and power it creates an elite who will attempt to 
organise the State to prevent others from impinging on their rights and power. Political 
ordering is part of the corporate market, not extraneous to it. 
 
This paper does argue that: 
i) a certain amount of disorder and inefficiency is not only an inevitable consequence of 
organisation itself, but that  
ii) disorder can be beneficial to civil society and to democracy. 
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In particular the paper proceeds by showing how ordering can create disorder through 
necessary technologies of ordering such as: categorisation, communication, disruptive 
reflexivity, and administration.   
 
On ordering 
Whatever the ordering system, only a relatively narrow band of events can be classed as 
ordered, while an infinite range of events can be classed as disordered. As a result ‘disorder’ 
seems much more common than ‘order’ (Bateson 1972, pp.3-8). The greater the precision 
demanded in the order, the greater the range of events which will appear disordering. Think 
of arranging objects on a tray. An obsessive person may demand that each object has a 
precise place so that even a millimetre displaced represents chaos, while a less demanding 
person may have a greater range of acceptable positions for the objects, and thus face less 
chaos and distress. Both of these hypothetical people might think that the other person’s 
arrangement was disordered, even if they had its purpose and method explained to them. This 
explaining might then lead to conflict as they realise their fundamental incompatibility, 
causing a further crisis of order as they try to assert their own order.  
 
Orderers tend to see what they classify as disorder as bad; as falling outside the categories 
they use to classify and order the world, unless it is to be classified as evil or threatening (cf 
Douglas 1966). They have a discomfort with ambiguity as well as disorder. This means that 
ordering is often incompatible with a politics which is not merely confirmatory of existing 
schemas, and is thus ineffective in situations of change, as change is categorised as threat or 
disorder. But being able to do what was done before would imply the situation was the same 
as previously, even though no situation is ever exactly the same as previously, only similar. 
What makes something similar, is itself an active ordering or categorising response which 
invokes the possibility of acting on the event similarly with similar success. In that sense, 
similarity is circular and precarious; as we only discover the situation is not similar enough 
when the ordering fails.  
 
Technologies of Ordering  
Order is frequently associated with what we might call ‘technologies of ordering’: 
classificatory systems, filing cabinets, command structures, divisions of labour, methods and 
structures of communication, arrangements of space, barriers, etiquette, maps, shelving and 
so on. As an example, we may think of the way government attempts to order people so as to: 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.2, No.1, 2010 25 
allocate rights, responsibilities and obligations; to provide services to those it considers 
worthy and refuse services to those not fitting that classification; or to decide who is a full 
member or citizen and who is not etc. It also aims to categorise its workers/administrators, so 
they can act and be controlled in that act. Computers and software are the tools commonly 
used nowadays to classify people, which leads to a whole set of problems in itself. We all 
know the excuse that ‘the computer will not let me do that’ and, as another example, 
computers also allow automated customer help call waiting ‘services’, which more efficiently 
parcel labour for the organisers, with the result that things often remain done incorrectly or 
remain undone. 
 
It is characteristic of all technologies that they both enable and restrict – not just one or the 
other. A filing cabinet, for example, puts everything partially out of reach, usually in an 
ultimately arbitrary order; documents can get lost in the cabinet, it might not be clear how the 
documents are classified, and documents usually have to be removed from the system to be 
useful, a pool of disordered documents usually accumulates before they go back into the 
filing system and so on. The potential for disorder allows the technology to function as well 
as fail. 
 
A technology, by definition, is something which simplifies and which excludes parts of the 
complexity of reality, in order to magnify other effects. Technology tends to both cut off 
unseen connections, and to make unseen connections. Technology: 
consists in substituting a man-devised organisation of matter, the ‘technosphere’, which 
is relatively crude and geared to the satisfaction of short-term anthropocentric ends for 
the ‘biosphere’ remarkable for its subtlety and geared to the maintenance of long-term 
stability (Goldsmith 1973,p. x) 1
 
.  
The relatively old book from which this remark comes, describes the unexpected and 
disruptive effects of technology on ‘natural systems’. Such events might be summarised 
(itself an ordering which deletes), as eventuating when ‘linear’ or ‘discrete unit’ based 
technology encounters a complex ‘cybernetic process’ or ‘flow’. The world is in some sense 
always in flux and always messy, with imperceptible links and complex consequences, and 
thus it escapes or resists attempts to render it linear, and break it into discrete units. Forcing 
                                                 
 
1 Today we might be less certain about the stability of the biosphere. It also undergoes constant change, and 
biological adaptation can subvert the aims of the technology as when bacteria become resistant to antibiotics and 
cleaning agents. 
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the world into linearality, or putting it under rules, can render the system unworkable, or lead 
it to work in unexpected ways, producing further disruption.  
 
As everything is constantly changing, technologies of ordering are all impermanent. 
Organisation always lags, and must always lag and hence be inaccurate, otherwise 
organisation does not provide a simplification that enables people to act. If the technology of 
ordering is maintained in the face of massive change then the ordering body will gradually 
even more lose touch with the reality. 
 
Rules 
The most obvious organisational technology is the rulebook, aiming to make things 
predictable, and events similar. As businessman Ricardo Semler writes: ‘In their quest for 
law, order, stability and predictability, corporations make rules for every conceivable 
contingency’ (1992, p.96), but rules can slow things down as well as speed things up – people 
spend hours arguing about how they should be interpreted, and about the situations they are 
being applied in, or they ignore the specifics in favour of the rule. As well as clarifying 
procedures, rules create distrust because they imply that people in the organisation cannot be 
trusted, and yet they have to be trusted. Rules divert attention from the organisations’ 
objectives, create extra work for rules checkers, fossilise behaviour which may no longer be 
appropriate, making development difficult, and direct people’s effort to creative rule bending, 
so that the organisation can work. Rules are necessary for order but create disorder. 
 
Law and the legal system could be a development of the rulebook, and ideally acts as a 
protection against arbitrary power, or at least clothes official violence in ritual and 
respectability. The legal system is precisely, a linear technology imposed on the complexities 
of social life. In practice, Western law avoids some of the resultant dilemmas by being 
situational, although pretending to be universal. Judges and juries steer their ways through 
strange intricacies which are often deleted when the decisions are reported with indignation 
in a couple of paragraphs, or seconds, in the media. Often those who consider themselves 
‘popular opinion’ want simple rules applied uniformly, except when it comes to themselves, 
when the complications previously ignored become obvious2
                                                 
2 Conservative newspaper columnist Miranda Divine, for example, frequently castigates judges and politicians 
for letting criminals go, while being indignant about suffering from the speeding laws which apply to her. 
. At other times the law is 
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applied rigorously and that can also seem to be a form of blindness or disruption. However, in 
general, the legal set-up recognises that what is the correct procedure in one situation may not 
be so in another situation which appears similar. The problem consists in deciding what is 
‘the same’. Rather than assuming that similarity automatically comes to the fore, people in 
the law deal with this problem through argument, and through attempts ‘to get away with 
things’3
 
. Those in the law, in effect, attempt to break the laws they are enforcing. This can 
lead to the legal system allowing people to render their responsibility opaque and sever the 
ties that the law supposedly reinforces. This is particularly marked in cases like Mabo, where 
the appropriating authority is trying to deal with the appropriation of the land that gives it its 
own legitimacy and force (Veitch 2007, especially pp.100ff.). 
However, the law often has to be contradictory in order to be fair. Despite the presumption of 
innocence, courts do not release all charged people before their trial, and sometimes this 
results in innocent people serving time in jail. Sometimes the accuser will be protected at the 
expense of the accused in an attempt to stop victims from being further traumatised (despite 
this assuming the guilt of the accused). Such problems cannot be avoided, and the fairer the 
situation the more such problems may arise. Incoherence may allow fairness as well as 
corruption – and fairness is not straightforward, as guilt, innocence and responsibility are not 
known in advance.  
 
Furthermore, it may never be possible to cover all possible cases, in all changing 
circumstances, by strict laws specified in advance, and if we attempt to do so then the system 
becomes a game of rules not ‘Justice’ and the system loses credibility. 
 
Categorisation 
Understandings and theories act as filters and selectors of events from the overwhelming flux 
of reality (Popper 1972, pp. 341ff.; Feyerabend 1999). Conceptual tools are a technology of 
ordering.  
 
                                                 
3 This situational law or justice would seem to undermine the Kantian categorical imperative (where moral 
action is independent of conditions and desires and each person ought to do what everyone should do in a 
similar situation) as, if the disorder is taken seriously, then it implies that staying with Kant’s order would 
render life impossible – a point made by one of Kant’s translators, although he does not think it undermines the 
theory in principle (Abbot 2005, pp.13ff). 
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Dividing the world into categories is a way of simplifying the world and of gathering things 
and events together which are different – there is rarely a category of one thing4
 
.  
Furthermore, humans do not, in general, categorise things and events in the classic Platonic 
manner by making a definition so that all things in the category are the same in the same way. 
Often, those things or events which belong in a category are placed in it in varied ways. They 
can be linked to a central item or prototype, being similar to it in different ways; they can be 
linked in chains in which distant members have very little in common and so on. Linkages 
can be influenced by the needs the users wish them to serve, the feelings users have about the 
categorised, or the ways the categorised fit in with other categorisations (as membership of a 
category is influenced by comparison with the other categories being deployed at the same 
time). Many or most categories will be ‘congeries’ or ‘collections’ rather than definitional. 
They, or their members, will also be subject to argument – ‘is that person a refugee, a 
resident alien, an overstaying tourist, or an economic migrant’, ‘do we have a class society’ 
etc. Membership in a category, and the category itself, almost always has the possibility of 
being challenged.  
 
Locating somebody in a category will give you some valid information about that person, but 
not everything the category implies is accurate. Thus because someone is a woman does not 
necessarily mean she is mathematics phobic or that she likes young children. The average 
man may be shorter than the average woman, but that tells us nothing about a particular 
woman and man.  A person will only share certain interests or properties with other people of 
the same category, and this can be cut through by other categories, such as class. An upper 
class woman may have more interests and properties in common with an upper class man 
than with her cleaning woman. People tend to spill out of categories, and thus categories can 
be misleading, even if necessary. 
 
Categories also create difference. Let us suppose we use religion as a primary classifier for 
people, then some people will be classified as belonging to religion X in relation to religion Y 
whether they particularly identify with religion X or not. Classification includes them in 
previous histories and rivalries, it forces people to emphasise a part of themselves, joins them 
with others they may want to break from, and allows others to treat them as defined by that 
                                                 
4 I have discussed the issues mentioned in this paragraph at length in Marshall (2006, 2007).  
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religion alone. This may then be enforced by violence. By replacing the mess of human 
actuality with sharp categories more tension and disorder can be created.  
 
It can be even more disordering to administer through computer programs which classify 
people in advance of the program being written. At least human categories have the 
possibility of ongoing change should they prove inadequate to the reality encountered, 
whereas computer categories cannot be altered without a great deal of work, which will 
probably not be done due to expense and inertia. The more rigorous and stable the demand 
for categorisation the greater the chance that categorisation will be misleading. 
 
People must categorise, so avoiding this problem of category-created chaos is impossible, but 
we can be more aware of it, or less aware of it, and more or less willing to alter our categories 
to fit with reality. Conceptual schemes are inevitably skewed and disordered with respect to 
reality and this is increased when they become the basis of communication – as one effect of 
categorisation is that ‘who’ a person is classified as will affect the way that their message is 
interpreted, and thus their intentions may be completely overwritten by their listener’s sense 
of appropriate order. 
 
Communication 
Communication while increasing the possibility of order is also disordered by order. Good 
communication is only possible between equals (Wilson 1980, pp.118-25) 5
 
. If punishment is 
possible then a person will adjust the message towards what they think the potential punisher 
wishes to hear. After several levels of hierarchy, and the same process, the message can be 
distorted beyond recognition. This is one basis of the power/stupidity nexus. However, if 
there is no punishment for bad messages then there is no guarantee that the messages will be 
accurate either, as it may still serve the interest of those below to be inaccurate.  
Hierarchy embodies secrecy and bad communication. Secrecy can be a resource used by 
managers to imply that they have access to a source of mysterious power or understanding, 
and it allows managers to protect their status by hiding mistakes. However, those beneath can 
simply assume the worst, and start a counter-secret chain of rumour which fills in the gaps 
                                                 
5 It shows the disreputability of disorder as a topic for theorisation, that many of the best generalisations about 
disorder in administration come from supposedly comic writing such as Wilson (1980), Parkinson (1958), Peter 
& Hull (1969), Adams (1996), and Haga & Acocella (1980). 
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and becomes the perceived truth of the organisation – again a ‘truth’ which is rarely reported 
upwards.  
 
Increasing the amount of communication does not mean that people will be better informed, 
as they can then start skipping messages to get to the ones they already know might be good 
or useful. The more information is available, the easier it is to select information that agrees 
with one’s previous biases6
 
. A related difficulty arises because redundancy helps a message 
to get through, or a meaning to occur – it allows people to reduce the ambiguity of words and 
symbols. Without redundancy and excess, the only way to ensure stability of meaning is 
through force or the suppression of noise (i.e. the unexpected or irrelevant), but if a message 
seems entirely noise free, expected or predictable then it has little information (Hayles 1989, 
p. 306). Attempts to reduce noise, such as spam filters in email, can then remove important 
messages that fit the way that spam is recognised. So redundancy threatens messages, as does 
removing it. 
Communication, in itself, does not always bring harmony, or solve the problems of social 
disorder, as it can propel people who disagree into conflict and it is harder to hate someone 
you don’t know exists (Marshall 2002). Consultation may even make people feel snubbed if 
they do not achieve what they hoped for, thus producing further alienation, or pushing people 
to silence or to hiding behind the noisy few who do get distributed and heard.  
 
Good communication takes time, toleration of misunderstanding, working out of difference 
and so on, and is thus inefficient. As communication consumes time, it also renders complete 
accuracy impossible in a complex and shifting situation. Hopes for complete accuracy and 
efficiency are simply disordering.  
 
Reflexivities 
A further consequence of these problems with communication is that social processes always 
combine order and disorder because of what we might call ‘multiple interactive reflexivities’. 
This simply means that everyone has some understanding of how the world works, how to 
interpret others, and how to operate within that world. Even the best attempts to render these 
                                                 
6 This is a kind of Gresham’s law of information; ‘bad information drives out good’. Ungar suggests we live in a 
‘knowledge aversive culture’ rather than a ‘knowledge society’ (2003). See also the idea of Agnotology, the 
study of culturally induced ignorance (Proctor & Schiebinger 2008). 
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understandings uniform, comes up against errors of transmission and replication. As a result 
there is always a complex divergence of views, interpretations of message and events and 
responses to those messages and events. Further, these reflexivities do not exist alone, but 
interact and modify each other. People are generally aware that other people are likewise 
operating according to some views and thus some, at least, will attempt to second guess, 
anticipate, help or avoid, the actions of others and the results of those actions. Thus even 
when there is general agreement and order, people will attempt to manipulate or subvert the 
results of those actions and orders. If people attempt to predict the actions of other people 
then that changes the situation, and this gets progressively more complicated, producing the 
kind of ‘fog’ that Clauswitz described of war (Beyerchen 1992-93).  
 
Post chaos theory and Lorenz’s butterfly effect, we can no longer be certain that the complex 
web of interaction between these different reflexivities will even-out into an ‘average’ 
response or into a predictable equilibrium (Eigenauer 1993, p.458). Therefore as what others 
will do, or the consequences of what they do, is never entirely predictable (especially when 
modified by the effects of other’s responses), disorder is always potentially present (Merton 
1936).  
 
One way of explicitly allowing the web of reflexivities into politics, is to allow or encourage 
the development of institutional bases for some of these knowledges and resistances to occur. 
Instead of aiming to oil away friction, the aim would be to allow the frictions to collect and to 
give them a semi-permanent basis for action. This goes against the general ‘cutting away of 
inefficiencies’ paradigm. However, even then, this ordering process is undermined by the 
time it takes to hear all the different views, never mind understand them or find a way of 
comparing them. It may, like consultation, even emphasise the knowledge that some people 
are not heard. Whatever the procedure, not everyone can be heard, and accepting the majority 
opinion does not really make sure that that majority is correct, or that it will not affect 
minorities adversely. While exclusion creates disorder, so does inclusion.  
 
Creativity and Problem Solving 
Creativity is inherent in almost any system that responds to the world and includes the world 
as an input/output. However, because it is driven by problems or sometimes by the random 
coming together of different ideas so as to form something new which allows a progression, 
creativity can be hampered by order. Order can prevent the new problems becoming 
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apparent, can resist solutions to the problems that challenge its ordering, and can hinder the 
coming together of random ideas. Order can also prevent the transmission of ideas as when 
people decide not to tell those higher in the organisation of a potential solution because they 
know it might be rejected and they would lose status by being associated with it. Order may 
not allow creativity in the sense of giving it the freedom, or wasted time, to develop an idea, 
as ideas are nearly always weak when first proposed and thus easily destroyed. Order may 
selectively store the memory both of previous failures and of previous successes that have 
resulted from following the path of order, and thus decide that creativity or the creative 
node/person is a failure. People engaged in ordering can also see creativity as a form of 
vandalism, of defacing its idols, and thus attempt to crush anything which ruins its treasured 
tidiness (Peckham 1979, pp. 274ff.).  
 
While people who operate within systems dominated by technologies of ordering are efficient 
at solving problems through moving symbols around in accordance with the official rules for 
symbol manipulation (say solving problems within a system, or framework, of established 
mathematics), they may not be so good at changing the meaning of symbols, changing the 
framework, or of opening new categories (so as to make a new branch of mathematics). The 
latter process involves changing modes of being or perceiving, and changing the ways that 
things will be done; and sometimes solving problems does need a complete shift of 
framework. This distinction resembles the one Samuel makes between ‘Priests’ and 
‘Shamans’ (1990, pp.106ff.). Priests work within the world of order; Shamans attempt to 
make a new world. What does seem probable is that both of these seemingly opposed kinds 
of approach are actually needed. The priests develop the discovery, and in so doing lead the 
shamans to a new take off point, for a new development, which is then explored completely 
and rigorously by the Priests. While Shamans might innovate a completely unreal or 
maladaptive system, Priests are rational administrators, but as we will see in the next section 
rational administration can also disrupt itself.  
 
What seems likely is that when the power system and the ordering systems are matched, then 
it is less probable that solutions which potentially disrupt order will be possible without 
seeming to be an overthrow of the whole set-up. The ordering will be defended at the 
ultimate cost of the system. Thus with the problems facing us with climate change, the 
capitalist mode of ordering seems largely incompatible with the necessary innovation to solve 
the problems. In NSW for example the government may make advertisements full of black 
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balloons displaying carbon emissions and asking us to cut electricity usage, while at the same 
time increasing electricity prices to keep old producers profitable and encouraging more coal 
mining in agricultural areas and under water tables, so as to fuel more coal fired power and 
hence more carbon emissions at potential long term ecological cost (SMH 20 March, 2010). 
The ordering system seems bent on defending itself against aspects of chaotic reality, thus 
provoking its ultimate disordering and downfall.  
 
Administration is Disruptive 
As Haga and Acocella point out, small amounts of organisation affect the ease with which 
people do things, and reduces anxiety by seeming to make the world more predictable and 
replicable. As a result, people assume that the more effort they put into administration then 
the easier and more predictable the situation becomes and more time they will save (1980, pp. 
19, 23). However, diminishing returns appear quickly, and more energy is soon spent 
organising than is saved through the organisation (ibid, pp. 24-5, 45ff.). It can, for example, 
easily take more time to file and catalogue everything neatly in a way which is obvious and 
efficient for every user, than it does to hope that people can find whatever they need by a 
more random search, or by keeping recently used files in a nearby pile (Abrahamson 2002). 
There is also a point at which the amount of anxiety generated by the organising exceeds the 
benefits (which might then prompt further attempts to reduce anxiety by engaging in more 
ordering). At a later point the organisation can have so many checks, backups and overseers 
that the amount of time that people spend ordering each other and checking that ordering, 
leads to paralysis (Haga & Acocella 1980, pp.54-5).  
 
While demands for measurable outcomes seem beneficial (as we would like to know if things 
are working), they can also disrupt the organisation’s functioning. Measuring the outcomes 
requires more administrators who thus lower the amount of resources devoted to delivering 
the services. Demands for accountability can take people away from the work they are 
supposed to be doing, to work that involves measuring what they should be doing. Then, the 
measurement tools may not be appropriate for the services offered, and force services into an 
inappropriate mode. We can focus on cost reduction in hospitals rather than on treating 
patients.  
 
Measurable outcomes lead to the threat of an organisation or a part of an organisation losing 
funding or income, if it does not come up to the measures. This might be inherently futile in 
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an organisation which is supposed to be creative and inventive, as it removes all recognition 
of the importance of failure. All attempts at creativity produce dead ends, mistakes and failed 
attempts. The fact that something is not possible, or some theory does not work, is 
informative but hard to measure in terms of success. Attempting to measure the success of 
creativity leads to measures of production and the organisation’s members get diverted into 
producing things which are uncreative or repetitive, as at least this can be counted. In general, 
most organisations deal with measurable outcomes or dependent funding, by forming 
committees, possibly hiring external specialists (who don’t know how the organisation 
works) to write applications for more money or to analyse their administration, appointing 
fact finding task forces, engaging in cost cutting and staff reduction (perhaps hiring more 
ignorant external advisors at great expense to do this) and so on. This overburdens the actual 
workers with paperwork, status reports, minutes, insecurity, putting effort into trying to 
defend their jobs rather than doing them etc. and the organisation can no longer do its 
business effectively. The result is that it becomes even more subject to the threat of losing 
income. However everything is highly organised and satisfying to managers who have done 
the best they can.  
 
This provides an example of Parkinson’s law, that ‘work expands to fill the time available’, 
which is perhaps a popular throwaway line suggesting that people generate work so they 
appear useful and worth having. More and more fine detail can be collected and commented 
upon; more reports produced, and the more time it takes to report on the reports (Parkinson 
1958, pp. 4-7). This may not be bad. It provides employment after all, distributing wealth 
usefully to people who will spend it, and gives their bosses the feeling that they are 
controlling some hive of activity. It defends people against their bosses, as they are just doing 
their jobs and organising things7
 
. It may also make the organisation resilient, as it has a horde 
of people familiar with its activities who can be moved to new areas of challenge. 
Inefficiency is not always bad. 
Parkinson adds that ‘an official wishes to multiply subordinates not rivals’ (1958, p. 5), but 
there may be more to growth than just expanding one’s sense of power and influence. We 
could also suggest that administration tends to increase, as redundancy demonstrates that you 
                                                 
7 Indeed the more a person’s position depends upon others higher up judging their performance, the more they 
are likely to generate work to be busy and necessary and keep their position. 
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are administering in the first place. The implicit logic is that if a stronger and repeated 
message is a clearer message, then more administration is better administration. Rescher 
suggests that management tends to bloat, not just because mangers appoint underlings, but 
because the more complex situations become, the more checks, controls and information 
gathering are required (1998, p.177). In that case, the more efficient information technology 
is, then the greater the swelling of management. Even governments who claim to want to 
reduce bureaucracy end up spending more on management, despite the cuts in the services 
they provide for ordinary people. Indeed, they often try harder and harder to make sure that 
the benefits are not exploited by the ‘lower classes’ or ‘undesirables’ with ever diminishing 
returns and increasing costs, but successfully making it harder still for people to obtain any 
legitimate help. Again, inefficiency can increase the more efficiency is promoted. 
 
Growth in numbers of administrative subordinates can also be beneficial. Semler notes that 
growth is needed in organisations, especially in business organisations, as growth allows the 
organisation to diversify and adapt so, if part of it fails, the rest can continue8
 
. Growth also 
provides new opportunities for employees. In a hierarchy, people either strive to be promoted 
or give up hope of being listened to. As attrition rates rarely equal ambitious hopes, the 
organisation risks losing people (and possibly trade secrets), or risks people losing their 
enthusiasm, and so the organisation may create an extra level or two, expanding to satisfy the 
ambitious and keep itself functional (Semler 1992, pp.263). 
More subordinates can also mean deeper bureaucracy, and the deeper the bureaucracy the 
more that local activities can be kept secret. Obviously this can lead to petty corruption and 
inefficiency safe from hindrance, but it can also lead to local flexibility, to attempts to adapt 
to local conditions and to keep the organisation functioning in ways which are not recognised 
by superiors in the ‘centre’. It can solve the problem of innovation when faced with 
challenging problems to the ordering system, as new solutions can be tried out unofficially 
and protected from interference by the secrecy provided by layers. These solutions can be 
discarded if they fail, or distributed (again perhaps secretly) through the system if they work. 
                                                 
8 Imagine a creature with only one skill. If the environment changes so that skill no longer applies, that creature 
is dead. A creature with more than one skill, or complexities it does not technically need, has a greater chance of 
finding more than one survival strategy, and hence of surviving. The same is likely for a collection of people 
with differing skills and views (Page 2007). Redundancy and disorder can be socially and adaptively beneficial 
as well as inevitable. 
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A good and functional bureaucracy is not an iron cage but something of a ‘mess with 
procedures’. 
 
However, again it is not simple. As Semler points out, with the increase in staff and levels: 
soon there is such a pollution of titles and levels – and a diffusion of responsibility and 
authority that much of management’s time is spent dealing with the inevitable conflicts, 
jealousies and confusion (1992, p.189). 
 
Organisations are often caught between expansion and discontent.  
 
If people do get promoted when they seem competent, then the principle that people tend to 
get promoted past their level of competence, can take hold (Peter & Hull 1969). Hindle 
argues that in ‘de-layered’ organisations, with much less hierarchy, ‘much of the 
incompetence has disappeared’ (2000, pp.171-2), while satirist Scott Adams points out that in 
‘the old days’ the structure of promotion generally meant that a manager had once been 
competent at something to do with the organisation’s purpose. Nowadays they can be 
imported from outside and thus be promoted ‘without ever passing through the temporary 
competence stage’ and having no experience of the work they will be administering (Adams 
1996, pp. 12-13). As these particular brought in managers maybe transient, there is also no 
incentive for them to produce long-term results, only short-term success, which can often be 
achieved at the reduction of longer-term viability. Contrary to Hindle, there is nothing to 
suggest that with a low hierarchy, a promotion to incompetence cannot have even more of a 
widespread bad effect, as there are fewer independent and competing competent modules to 
keep the organisation functional. The manager may have more, rather than less power over 
their underlings with no intermediary buffer, thus spreading their incompetence further. 
Lower hierarchies, especially when key strokes can be traced, imply less separation between 
the centre and the periphery, and less room for the periphery to move and adapt to local 
conditions, thus decreasing the ability of organisations to adapt, and increasing the amount of 
inaccurate information the centre will receive to plan its response. The more inefficiency and 
redundancy, the more this effect may be countered; the more efficiency the more the effect 
will disrupt. 
 
Some evidence for promotional incompetence is collected by William Starbuck (1992, 
Mezias & Starbuck 2003), who reports research suggesting that the abilities of managers to 
plan or actually predict the effects of their decisions is quite low; companies with no formal 
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strategic planning perform as well as those who do. However, managers involved in planning 
tend to evaluate their effectiveness and their actions very highly. As already discussed, these 
managers will get positive feedback from their underlings who know what is expected, and 
they are therefore fairly ignorant of reality. Starbuck told Abrahamson and Freedman that 
when ‘corporate heads of finance were asked to estimate their companies’ sales volumes over 
the previous five years; 60% of them couldn’t come close’, and ‘The perceptions of 
executives are usually terribly wrong… Sometimes it’s truly ludicrous’ (Abrahamson and 
Freedman 2006, pp.43-4). This in itself could be expected to produce disorganisation and 
anxiety in the workplace as people are driven by the plan, not the reality.  
 
Another explanation for managerial incompetence is that managerial focus is often directed 
internally to other managers and staff, not externally to the environment or to the people the 
organisation impinges upon, as that is a requirement of getting on in managerial systems. 
Resources are allocated throughout an organisation by its administration and administrative 
structure. The more such resources are distributed internally or the more there is an apparent 
shortage of these resources, the more the focus of competition will be internal9
 
. Therefore, 
administration has a tendency to be maladaptive to ‘externalities’, no matter what the kind of 
organisation is.  
The State 
One of the biggest allocators of resources and of defence is the State. The State has an odd 
ontology. It is clearly not a thing in itself, yet we treat it as such (Radcliffe Brown 1940, 
p.xxiii; Geertz 2004, particularly the commentary). The State is not necessarily independent 
of other forces. For example, today, it seems common to argue that the State should be 
administered like a corporation10
                                                 
9 The internal focus, internal loyalties, or fear of open communication, may reinforce a hidden regime of fraud 
or recklessness. Vaughan calls this part of the ‘dark side of organisations’ and remarks that: ‘Surprisingly,… 
harmful actions and the extensive social costs to the public-the dark side of organizations-are not claimed as 
central to the domain of sociologists who define their specialization as organizations, occupations, and work’ 
(1999, p.272). It could be hypothesised that this learned ignorance results because of our focus on ordering 
processes rather than on disordering.  
, even though a corporation has fairly different imperatives, 
rarely lasts long, and can declare bankruptcy so that all involved can move elsewhere without 
much hindrance, something a State cannot do. Management techniques appropriate to 
business may not work elsewhere, and may disrupt the State itself. 
 
10 IBM’s explicit contribution to this discourse can be found at http://www.businessofgovernment.org 
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Irrespective of how it is administered, by its existence the State creates resources which are 
limited, such as positions of power, privilege and control over money flows. As a result, 
conflict is at the heart of the State; both in the relations between people internal to the 
administration and in their relationships to those defined as potential fellows or outsiders 
(Elias 1970; Baker 1979, pp.21-3, 41ff., 59). We could define the State as the conceptual 
locale in which war is continued by, or contained within, largely non-violent means. 
However, non-violent combat implies recognition, so if this is not granted by one or other of 
the parties involved then violence can be deployed, with the success of that violence 
determining its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the winning party. The equation of power 
with violence is another base of the power/stupidity nexus – the powerful do not have to think 
about things, they can hit them (Graeber 2004, pp.72-3). However if violence is not equal to 
the task of imposing consent, then we have civil war which, as a truism, only occurs when 
there is a State or potential State to be fought over. Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, the struggle of 
all against all, requires the State in order to exist.  
 
Over the last three hundred years the Western State has expanded to allow more people to 
participate. This increased the range of civil society, from nobles and their functionaries, 
through males with certain amounts of property, to males of non-official religions, to women, 
to all adults irrespective of property, to making sure minorities have representation.  
 
This expansion caused a great deal of panic amongst those who traditionally controlled the 
State and there has been some narrowing in effective general participation after the sixties 
with an increasing influence or dominance of the corporate sector (Marshall 2009). This was 
an organised solution to the not insignificant problem of getting consensus. The more the 
State expresses or acknowledges the multiple reflexivities of people and legitimates them, 
then the more it can be challenged as weak, ineffective and confused. Yet narrowing the State 
to make it more controllable also appears to fail, both socially and ecologically, because it 
excises parts of the world, and thus deletes views which do not come from, or do not match 
those of approved power holders. Sometimes these deletions will occur because of the 
communicative factors we have discussed above, and sometimes it may be deliberate (see 
Hamilton & Maddison 2007; Marr 2007; Shulman 2007). Whatever the case, intensive 
ordering lowers communication and the possibilities of feedback. 
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Attempts to impose an order in favour of business have possibly generated financial crisis 
and self-destructive behaviour as non-pro-corporate perceptions and knowledges were not 
included in the State’s ambit, and the actions of capitalists could not be curtailed in principle. 
Bailouts brought about by the failure to listen to warnings about the flaws in the system could 
be alienating voters and leading to legitimacy crises. So attempts to tighten control may 
eventually loosen it, or they may eventually lead to the systems destruction (ultimate 
disorder) if the failed businesses are bailed out, and continue to act in the same manner – that 
is, to maintain the order they prefer. Despite this apparent increase in control, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the traditional holders of power feel more secure than they did. If we 
listen to those who support them in the media, then we hear a constant cry of dismay that 
their power is so fragmentary. Blame can be put on quite unlikely candidates, creating further 
ignorance, and leading to further postponement of action, and more attempts to increase 
control. 
 
If organisation is initially a way of reducing anxiety, then organisation will be applied when 
anxiety arises. Organisers fear those who are not orderable. If, for example, it is true as Ron 
Suskind reports that Dick Cheney put forward the idea that “if there is a one percent chance” 
that someone might do something dreadful to them, then the US Government had to “treat it 
as a certainty”, and that it was “not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of 
evidence [but] about our response” (2006, p.62), then this attempt to impose order would not 
only be never ending, but would lead into wars with little strategic benefit, which might then 
produce further long-term problems, distrusts and hostilities. Having zero tolerance for 
disorder could lead to disaster. As suggested by earlier remarks the order of communication 
imposed by high-level command, meant that confirmatory evidence was found or reported, 
unclear data was framed in terms of suspicion, and any disconfirmation was ignored.  
 
At a lesser level these kind of fears drive surveillance, which has the potential to further 
generate terror in the suspect population, and increases their sense of grievance and of not 
fitting in with the other parts of society, and thus generates some support for the disorderly 
and perhaps even makes people consider disorder in revenge. Disorder and anxiety is 
increased and the rights that are supposed to be defended are suppressed.  
 
Fears of the disorders of violence drive the likelihood of violence, or the likelihood of locking 
down the society’s capacity to adapt to the changes which make internal violence more 
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likely. The more capacity the State has, the more potential it also has for over-riding 
dissidents and people who disagree with its actions, and hence the more distrust it generates. 
If the State could tolerate the idea of disorder then organised, or common, violence could be 
seen as an indication that something is wrong and might need to be repaired or changed, 
rather than just suppressed.  
 
However, there is never any guarantee that complete peace and order can be reached at all 
times. We made need to remember Durkheim’s point that crime is normal (and sometimes 
created by morals, so the more moral and controlled people are the more likely trivial things 
become violations of those morals) and that therefore ‘specialists’ in crime will play into the 
possibilities of violence. Charles Tilly (2003a) implies that the more States attempt to 
efficiently and effectively police and organise categories, boundaries and exclusions, then the 
more likely they are to generate groups of people whose identities are based in these 
exclusions.  These groups then provide the basis for violence specialists to put in place the 
organisation, advance planning, prior training, logistical preparation, and strategic co-
ordination which is required for mass disordering violence, which may then be directed at the 
State, its ‘members’ or minority scapegoats who are perceived as being included in the State 
rather than being with the excluded. Attempts to crack down on the potential violence, also 
has the possibility of increasing violence by involving people previously on the margins and 
forcing them into the ‘despised’ category. Tilly (2003b) also points out that if trust networks 
grow up outside the State, and we might add the more these are organised, then it is more 
likely such people will opt out of the State or attempt to exploit it for their own benefit. This 
may then, we can suppose, impact on ability of their trust networks to survive.  
 
Such factors make it a fundamental, and possibly unsolvable, issue for a State that believes in 
‘freedom’ and ‘Rights’ as to how it acts towards people within its sway who would 
overthrow it, or who would claim it is their Right to suppress others. Certainly it would seem 
impossible to propose a general ordered solution to that problem. Maintaining internal peace 
is a matter of ongoing struggle, not just attempting to fit people in, but attempting the perhaps 
impossible task of changing, or relaxing, the order to produce minimal exclusion. 
 
A Step Forward into Useful Disorder? 
In the West and perhaps elsewhere, people have generally called for greater order and 
efficiency to solve our problems, without considering whether this order will produce further 
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disorder, or if disorder may be valuable (even a sign of upwelling creativity). I have 
discussed some fundamental technologies of order, such as rules, categorisation, 
communication, law and administration, and have attempted to show the paradoxes that are 
involved in using them, and how these technologies both enable and restrict. These 
technologies while helping people to do things, also distort the world they are ordering, they 
force contrasts and similarities, rather than look at variety. I suggested that those in the Law 
attempt to deal with these problems through argument, by not assuming that similarity is 
obvious but that it has to be established, and that even then problems arise. In this sense 
Justice and Rights are not categories with strict definitions which are always everywhere the 
same, and attempts to behave as if they were can add confusions and distort reality. They are 
disordered congeries, which people struggle over with their differing interpretations. The 
terms may allow us to add the appearance of order, but they are not ordered in themselves. 
 
I have also suggested that good communication is inherently inefficient, and requires some 
inefficiency and lack of hierarchy in order to work. Furthermore, because of the problems of 
multiple reflexivities, not only will communication frequently be concerned with strategy 
rather than accuracy, but predictions about human behaviour will tend to be unstable and self-
defeating. Inclusion and exclusion both create disorder. Similarly, administration, partly 
because it is concerned with ordering, is plagued with problems of disorder which undermine 
its efficiency, and this may not be a bad thing in all cases as this inefficiency can further the 
organisation’s chances of survival. People in management may find, that in order to survive 
as managers, most of their energy has to be directed at an internal environment rather than the 
environment that the organisation depends upon, so that the organisation may eventually 
flounder in its internal efficiency. It may also be harmful to translate a successful mode of 
ordering from one situation to another, as the situations differ and will require different kinds 
of responses. If ordering produces disorder, and the more so the more rigorous the order, then 
there are diminishing returns in pursuing order and efficiency. 
 
As a result of these incoherencies there are few, if any, uniform rules for administration. 
Formalised values crystallise certainty and order, rather than recognise uncertainty and 
disorder, or the possibility of different situations, different categorisations, change, and 
struggle, and hence reality itself. There is probably no solution, but I will propose a 
minimalist position, resembling Popper’s falsification theory of science (Popper 1972, 
passim). This states that we cannot tell if a proposition or theory is true (as we will always be 
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able to find confirmations), however, we should be able to see if it fails. Thus instead of 
deciding that we know what ‘Justice’ is, or ‘Rights’ are, or even what ‘Efficiency’ is, we can 
argue over whether a particular decision was unjust, or efficient, or not. There will usually be 
more agreement about what is unjust than about what is Just, in the same way as there can be 
more agreement about what is disordered than what is ordered. Thus, while Rights are the 
only discourse we have to talk about Rights, we will be better served not by attributing Rights 
in abstract but by objecting to lacks of Rights, by recognising conflict and unresolvability, 
and by realising Rights are born and maintained in struggle and competition. 
 
Democracy occurs when friction between people is allowed and recognised; when people 
have the time and place to make objections, to try and slow things down, and to circumvent 
rules they think are stupid. Inefficiency allows debate and encourages the ordering to adapt 
responsively to the environment it is both in and creates. Removing institutions such as state 
governments, local councils, churches, trade unions, business councils, resident’s groups etc. 
removes distributed knowledge of the system and usually seems aimed at removing the 
frictions facing power so that power can be unimpeded once a decision has been made.  
 
In Australia, the presence of competing civil organisations, levels of bureaucracy, and the 
three tiers of government mean that governmental bodies have different allegiances, so it is 
harder for any one group to take over all the machinery, and it provides more institutional 
space that can be occupied by marginal groups. People can have some hope that their 
objections against injustice will be heard, rather than just being ignored quickly and 
efficiently. 
 
There was some effective resistance against John Howard’s Government and its apparently 
totalising plans, because of wasteful state governments. Duplication, although costing more, 
frequently acts as a check on the power of one organisation, as not everything is done by that 
one organisation and its masters. The question could be: ‘does this extra spending really 
count as waste when it acts to check total power?’ In any case, should we allow some kind of 
economic judgement to be the only form of judgement that is applied to all possible events, 
including its own failure? It is doubtful that any one schema can deal with the fact that people 
want to live differently, and judge the success of events by different schema. Again we hit the 
problem of an overarching ordering being inherently intolerant and disordering, no matter 
how inclusive it might want to be. The economic rationalist order wishes to include everyone 
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and everything as wage labour or resource – something which perhaps not everyone wishes to 
be the case – and indeed most economic rationalists probably do not treat their families in 
that way. In any society there will be competing ideas and concepts about what is order, what 
order looks like and so on. Thus ‘order’ may be socially positioned and this is why I have not 
attempted to define ‘order’ and ‘disorder’; such definitions are a political act.  
 
In decision making the usual path is to seek what we all agree on, and disregard the rest, yet it 
may be in the discards that the energy lies, and where people have the most enthusiasm. Thus 
finding the points of agreement may mean that you have an agreement nobody cares about, 
and cannot actually hold people together. The general blandness of the 2020 reports is a case 
in point. The initial report stated that: 
It is only by having these kinds of conversations that we have any hope of understanding 
our challenges, their possible solutions, and ultimately each other. 
This does not mean we will always agree, and we have disagreed this weekend about 
many things. Though interestingly, there was a large measure of agreement about many 
of the major challenges, even if sometimes sharp differences of opinion were evident in 
discussing solutions. We should not be afraid of disagreement. Indeed an important 
feature of a liberal democracy is respect for conflicting ideas; difference is part of the 
human condition (2020 Initial Report, p. 1). 
 
However, there was little if any trace of this disagreement left in that report, which mainly 
consisted of statements that people would like nice things to happen. It suppressed dissent 
and fracture for the appearance of a dull uniformity which was expressive of little, and gave 
little sense of how these nice things would be brought about11
 
. The result was that it seems to 
have been ignored. 
An experimental politics recognises that solutions are not known in advance. Politics have to 
be adjusted; even the best and most reasonable ideas will not always work. Thus we have to 
allow things to go wrong rather than to cover them up, or assume that if we apply the policies 
a little more strongly or a little more lengthily they will start to work.  
 
I propose slow, inefficient, government, like slow food. Speed is often confused with 
efficiency as if when something is faster then it is more responsive; but it can also be less 
responsive. If, for example, you are driving a car at 200 kph there is less chance of veering to 
miss if something happens suddenly. Efficiency removes ‘room to manoeuvre’, ‘space which 
                                                 
11 Accounts given to me of the conference by those who attended or who knew people who attended, suggest 
that some participants actively felt excluded and ignored by this harmonising procedure.  
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allows a relaxed considered response’, ‘stored resources’ and ‘resilience’. As usual, the 
opposite is also true: moving too slowly can also disrupt. The response, while precise, misses 
because the events have already moved on. Speed is sometimes needed. There is no easy 
answer. 
 
However, it would seem to be useful to be aware of two things. Firstly, that all systems of 
governance, or ordering, are subject to incoherence and will produce disorder; the more 
efficient and more total the order the more likely it will result in disruptive and destructive 
disorder. Secondly, it is useful to recognise this incoherence and the possible benefits that 
arise from allowing disorder and friction, especially if you are in favour of some kind of 
democracy. Perhaps a society, or State, can only be representative, democratic and inclusive 
if its members can accept a degree of inefficiency, ambiguity and lack of control?  
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